Lots of interesting stuff in this talk by Larry Wilkerson, Colin PowellÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s chief of staff at the State Department. It’s been widely linked, and among the sections many commentators have picked out is this one, reminding those who easily forget such things how broad was the consensus in early 2003 that Saddam Hussein had some sort of WMD program that was far in advance of what’s been found in Iraq since his fall.
I canÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t tell you why the French, the Germans, the Brits and us thought that most of the material, if not all of it, that we presented at the U.N. on 5 February 2003 was the truth. I canÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t. IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢ve wrestled with it. I donÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t know ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ and people say, well, INR dissented. ThatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a bunch of bull. INR dissented that the nuclear program was up and running. ThatÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s all INR dissented on. They were right there with the chems and the bios. Carl Ford and I talked; Tom Finger and I talked, who is now John NegroponteÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s deputy, and that was the way INR felt. And, frankly, I wasnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t all that convinced by the evidence IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢d seen that he had a nuclear program other than the software. That is to say there are some discs or there were some scientists and so forth but he hadnÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢t reconstituted it. He was going to wait until the international tension was off of him, until the sanctions were down, and then he was going to go back ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ certainly go back to all of his programs. I mean, I was convinced of that.
But I saw satellite evidence, and IÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢ve looked at satellite pictures for much of my career. I saw information that would lead me to believe that Saddam Hussein, at least on occasion, was spoofing us, was giving us disinformation. When you see a satellite photograph of all the signs of the chemical weapons ASP ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ Ammunition Supply Point ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ with chemical weapons, and you match all those signs with your matrix on what should show a chemical ASP, and theyÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢re there, you have to conclude that itÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â€žÂ¢s a chemical ASP, especially when you see the next satellite photograph which shows the U.N. inspectors wheeling in in their white vehicles with black markings on them to that same ASP and everything is changed, everything is clean. None of those signs are there anymore….
The consensus of the intelligence community was overwhelming. I can still hear George Tenet telling me, and telling my boss in the bowels of the CIA, that the information we were delivering ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ which we had called considerably ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ we had called it very much ÃƒÂ¢Ã¢â€šÂ¬Ã¢â‚¬Å“ we had thrown whole reams of paper out that the White House had created. But George was convinced, John McLaughlin was convinced that what we were presented was accurate. And contrary to what you were hearing in the papers and other places, one of the best relationships we had in fighting terrorists and in intelligence in general was with guess who? The French. In fact, it was probably the best. And they were right there with us.